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Abstract
Data brokers share consumer data with rivals and, at the same time, compete with
them for selling. We propose a ’co-opetition’ game of data brokers and characterize
their optimal strategies. When data are ’sub-additive’ with the merged value net
of the merging cost being lower than the sum of the values of individual datasets,
data brokers are more likely to share their data and sell them jointly. When data are
’super-additive’, with the merged value being greater than the sum of the individual
datasets, competition emerges more often. Finally, data sharing is more likely when
data brokers are more e cient at merging datasets than data buyers.
JEL codes: D43, L13, L86, M31.
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1 Introduction
In today’s highly digitized economy, data have become particularly valuable and have
attracted the attention of policymakers and institutions. To mention some examples, in
2018 the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to protect personal data was
promulgated, and the State of California followed suit with the California Consumer
Privacy Act. In 2020, the European Commission announced the EU Data Strategy (Euro-
pean Commission, 2020) to boost data sharing among firms and the recently proposed
Digital Market Act includes mandatory data sharing as a crucial competition tool. The
conventional view is that being non-rival, data can generate positive externalities, and the
EU data strategy’s vision is that data sharing has to be incentivized or even mandated.
If data are considered the fuel of the digital economy, ’data brokers’ are its catalyst.1 These
often unknown actors are ’companies whose primary business is collecting personal
information about consumers from a variety of sources and aggregating, analysing,
and sharing that information’ (Federal Trade Commission, 2014) and engage mostly
in business-to-business relations. As they do not usually have any contact with final
consumers, the latter are often unaware of their existence. A defining characteristic of
this sector is that data brokers transact and exchange data with each other and more
information is obtained thisway than fromdirect sources. The Federal TradeCommission
(2014) reports that seven out of nine data brokers were buying and selling consumer data
to each other. For example, Acxiom has partnerships with other data brokers, including
Corecom (specialized in entertainment data) and Nielsen (a global data company).
Yet, these sharing practices might not necessarily be consistent with the positive social
role envisioned in the current regulatory debate and, more worryingly, may hide anti-
competitive behaviours. As little is known about the behaviours of these data brokers,
investigations worldwide are taking place. For instance, the French authority CNIL
carried out an in-depth investigation in the period 2017-2019 auditing fifty data brokers
and ad-tech companies (Financial Times, 2019).
In this context, our main research question is to identify the incentives of data brokers to
share data in some markets and compete in others and how these relate to the nature of
the data a data broker has. This is relevant as, on the one hand, these companies compete
to provide customers with specialized data, analytics, and market research; on the other
hand, they also cooperate through partnerships and data sharing agreements. Moreover,
data brokers may be particularly strong in di erent areas and specialize in some services,
rendering the nature and type of data crucial for their strategies. For example, Acxiom
and Datalogix profile consumers for targeting purposes, collecting information such as
demographics, sociographics, and purchasing behaviours. Data brokers like Corelogic
and eBureau mostly sell in-depth financial and property data analytics.
1The Economist (2017), ’Fuel of the future: data is giving rise to a new economy’, May 6, 2017.
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To this end, we present a simple yet rather general model to analyse how the nature of
data and merging costs shape data brokers’ decisions. Our economy consists of two
data brokers and one data buyer. Throughout the paper, we use ’the (data) buyer’ and
’the downstream firm’ interchangeably. The consumer level information held by data
brokers potentially allows the downstream firm to increase its profits in its own market.
For instance, a firm can use data to facilitate targeted advertising, to engage in price
discrimination, or to adopt data-driven management practices.2 Data brokers, on the
other hand, can either share data and produce a consolidated report or compete to
independently supply the downstream firm. If the data brokers share data, they incur
an upstream merging cost. If the data brokers compete and the buyer acquires both
datasets, then the buyer needs to merge them incurring a downstream merging cost.
We find that the underlying incentives to engage in either data sharing or competition
crucially depend on whether the value of the merged dataset, net of the merging costs,
shows forms of complementarities or substitutabilities. Indeed, datamay be super-additive
when combining two data sources, net of the merging costs, results in a more valuable
dataset than the sum of the individual components. Combining the browsing history
with email addresses, for example, would provide a detailed picture of the preferences
of a certain consumer and enable targeted o ers. In this example, data create synergies
and become more valuable when merged.
Data are sub-additive when aggregating two datasets leads to a new value, net of the
merging costs, that is lower than the sum of the two separate datasets. For examples,
datasets might present overlapping information, diminishing marginal returns of data,
correlated data points, or high merging costs. Finally, when combining two di erent
data sources is extremely costly, a sharp reduction in the merged dataset’s net value may
occur. This represents a case of extreme sub-additivity and the value of the merged dataset
is lower than the stand-alone value of its components.
Data sharing arises for two main reasons. First and foremost, to soften competition
between data brokers; second, to enable data brokers to internalize potential merging
cost ine ciencies on the buyer’s side. The balance of these two e ects drives our results.
The former contrasts with the pro-competitive vision of data sharing, whereas the latter
is consistent with the socially valuable perspective permeating the regulatory debate.
Suppose data brokers are more e cient than the buyer in handling data. Then, when
the data structure is sub-additive or extreme sub-additive both e ects favour sharing. By
merging sub-additive datasets, data brokers can avoid granting the buyer the discount
that results from competition and reflects the overlapping information and the buyer’s
merging cost. In the presence of an extreme sub-additive data structure resulting from a
2Note that our stylized setting could still accommodate competition in the productmarket. Essentially, we
assume that consumer level data creates extra value for the downstream firm and enhances its profitability
in a given market environment, as if multiple buyers have independent interactions with the data brokers.
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highmerging cost, themechanism is similar: as the buyer is only interested in one dataset,
sharing avoids an intense, Bertrand-like, competition. When data complementarities
are present, there exists a multiplicity of equilibria under competition and these render
sharing less likely to occur: one data broker may prefer to veto a sharing agreement
when it expects to grab a larger share of the surplus than the sharing rule prescribes.
However, not always are data brokers more e cient than buyers in merging datasets.
For example, as a former partnership between Facebook and Acxiom suggests, a tech
company may acquire information from data brokers, and the former can be more
e cient in handling data, given its expertise and computational capabilities.3 In this
case, the cost internalisation incentive is clearly not present. However, an incentive to
share data does exist when the value of the combined dataset is limited. Specifically,
sharing avoids fierce competition when the datasets are extreme sub-additive. When
instead the datasets are sub-additive, the two forces driving the incentives to share
are now in contrast. On the one hand, data brokers may be willing to share to soften
competition and avoid discounting the overlapping component of the datasets. On the
other hand, independent selling avoids the high merging cost facing the data brokers.
Overall, depending on the nature of the data and merging costs, data brokers may
compete to supply a client firm in one market and, at the same time, cooperate and
share data in another market. In this sense, our model successfully explains ’co-opetition’
between data brokers, a characterising feature of the sector.
Our modelling of data intermediaries is consistent with some distinguishing characteris-
tics of the data market. First, our model captures that the value of data is contextual. For
example, the same two datasets can be substitutes or complements depending on their
final use and downstream market circumstances (Sarvary and Parker, 1997). While our
model abstracts away from the specifics of the downstream market and sheds light on
both substitute and complementary data, it is compatible with a market where data bro-
kers repeatedly interact to supply downstream buyers in di erent sub-markets and with
buyer-specific projects. Second, combining and sharing data sources can be substantially
more costly than bundling other products. This highlights a crucial di erence between
data, that can be merged and disposed, and product bundling.4 For instance, merging
datasets requires resource intensive preparation of the data, and this may result in a
very low net value of the final dataset. We highlight the importance of merging costs in
shaping the data market outcome and characterize conditions for sharing to emerge in
the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Finally, we discuss the possibility of data
partitioning as, unlike many other products, a data broker may be able to partly control
the potential complementarity and substitutability when selling data.
3This partnership was in place between 2015 and 2018 (Acxiom, 2015).
4For the potential anti-and pro-competitive e ects of bundling see, e.g., Choi (2008).
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Contribution to the literature. This article focuses on the market for data and the role
of data intermediaries. The main contribution of our paper is to capture the co-existence
of competition and co-opetition between data brokers, and identify the determinants of
the transition between these. The closest papers to ours are Sarvary and Parker (1997),
Bergemann et al. (2019) and Ichihashi (2021). Sarvary and Parker (1997) focus on
the incentives of information sellers (e.g., consultancy, experts) to sell reports about
uncertain market conditions to downstream firms, interested in finding the real state of
the world. A crucial role is played by the reliability of information, data complementarity
or substitutability. In our framework, complementarity and substitutability are mediated
by the presence of downstream and upstreammerging costs, and data refer to individual
characteristics rather than their reliability about the correct state of the world.
Instead, Bergemann et al. (2019) and Ichihashi (2021) analyse competition between data
brokers in obtaining data from consumers which can then be sold downstream. Similarly
to ours, Ichihashi (2021) considers a setting in which data intermediaries compete to
serve a downstream firm with consumer data. However, he focuses on the welfare
implications of data collection, whereas we explicitly study the incentives of data sharing
and its implications for market actors.
Other studies have concentrated on related issues as privacy violations and anti-competitive
practices stemming from access to data (Conitzer et al., 2012; Casadesus-Masanell and
Hervas-Drane, 2015; Clavorà Braulin and Valletti, 2016; Choi et al., 2019; Gu et al., 2019;
Montes et al., 2019; Belleflamme et al., 2020; Ichihashi, 2020; Bounie et al., 2021, inter
alios), strategic information sharing and signal jamming in oligopoly (Vives, 1984; Raith,
1996; Kim and Choi, 2010) and, more recently, the impact of data-driven mergers (Kim
et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2020; De Cornière and Taylor, 2020; Prat and Valletti, 2021).
Our study also contributes to the recent law and economics literature on data sharing.
In line with recent regulatory developments, this literature takes a mostly favourable
view of the practice, based on the premise that, from a social perspective, there is not
enough data sharing. For example, in Prüfer and Schottmüller (2021), data sharing
might prevent tipping outcomes in data-driven markets. Graef et al. (2018) argue that
the right to data portability, which enhances personal data sharing, should be seen as
a new regulatory tool to stimulate competition and innovation in data-driven markets.
Borgogno and Colangelo (2019) underline that data sharing via APIs requires a costly
implementation process and to leverage their pro-competitive potential a regulatory
intervention is necessary. Our results, instead, point to the possibility of excessive data
sharing, through a harmful use of data to soften competition between data holding firms.
This adds to other negative aspects of data sharing, as the overutilisation of data pools
or the reduced incentives for data gathering (Graef et al., 2019; Martens et al., 2020).
To a lesser extent, the issue we tackle shares similarities with patent pools (Lerner and
Tirole, 2004, 2007) and how substitutability/complementarity might engender anti- or
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pro-competitive e ects. In our framework, merging costs play an important role and
interact with other forces in inducing data sharing. Moreover, a relevant di erence
between data and patent pools is that the latter can be considered as a structured combi-
nation of ideas whereas the former is a factor of production (Jones and Tonetti, 2020).
Further, unlike patents, data also have the characteristics of experience (Koutroumpis
and Leiponen, 2013) and multipurpose goods (Duch-Brown et al., 2017). While data
and data brokers have distinctive features that characterize them in general, our frame-
work may be applicable in other settings featuring substitutability or complementarity.
For example, the two upstream firms might be patent holders deciding to pool their
technologies or license them independently to a downstream firm.
Outline. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model.
Our main results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 explores several extensions to our
main model and Section 5 concludes with final remarks. A microfoundation of the data
structure and all proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 The model
The data brokers. Consider an economy with two data brokers, k = 1, 2, who are
endowed with data on di erent individuals and attributes. Each data broker (DB) may
have independent access to a subset of the attributes.5
To fix ideas, let fk Ø 0 be the extra surplus the buyer in question can generate by using
the data owned by data broker k, compared to a situation in which no data are available
(i.e., f(0) = 0). The value function f can be interpreted as the monetary evaluation of
the dataset from the perspective of the data buyer.
Data from di erent sources can be combined in a single dataset. This assembling
process a ects the value of the final dataset, depending on the underlying data structure,
as defined below. In the absence of merging costs, a data structure is super-additive if
f12 Ø f1 + f2 and sub-additive if f12 < f1 + f2, where f12 Ø 0 is the value of the merged
dataset to the buyer in question.6
The data structure identifies a continuum of cases depending on the value of the merged
dataset. It is super-additive when datasets are complements and their combination
returns a final output whose value is at least as large as the sum of the individual
components. There are indeed synergies in the data which lead to the creation of a
more informationally powerful dataset. This may happen when the interaction between
5For instance, this may result from a comparative advantage in di erent areas or from the di erent
volumes of data they gathered. For more details, see, e.g., Lambrecht and Tucker (2017).
6More details about the microfoundation of the data structure can be found in the Appendix.
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di erent types of data plays a crucial role. For example, online purchasing history
combined with credit card data collected o ine can lead to data complementarity.
The data structure is sub-additive when the value of the merged dataset is lower than the
sum of the values of individual datasets but is at least as large as either of the individual
datasets. This happens when the two merging datasets have overlapping information.
The data structure is extreme sub-additive when the value of the merged dataset is lower
than the value of an individual dataset. For instance, Dalessandro et al. (2014) suggest
that, in some circumstances, adding additional data may be detrimental, and better
predictions can be made with fewer data points. This is consistent with the seminal
findings of Radner and Stiglitz (1984) who show theoretically that information can have
a negative marginal net value. While a negative marginal value of information is caused
by strictly positive information-acquisition costs in Radner and Stiglitz (1984), in our
framework the underlying force is the presence of non-negligible merging costs as we
shall discuss below. Moreover, some customer attributes can be collinear or positively
correlated (see, e.g., Bergemann and Bonatti, 2019) and then lead to overlapping insights,
whereas in other cases data can be di cult to integrate (see, e.g., health data in Miller
and Tucker, 2014). Similar decreasing returns to scale are present in the recent literature
on algorithms (Bajari et al., 2019; Claussen et al., 2019; Schäfer and Sapi, 2020).
Data brokers obtain revenues by selling their dataset. This can happen in two ways.
First, data brokers can sell their own dataset independently and simultaneously to the





0 if the downstream firm does not buy k’s data
pk if the downstream firm buys k’s data
, (1)
where pk is DB k’s price for its own data.
Alternatively, data brokers can share their data and sell a single dataset. In this case, they
jointly act as the unique data seller and make a take-it-or-leave-it o er to that specific
buyer. In case of a sale, their joint profit is P12 ≠ cdb, where P12 identifies the price jointly
set by the two data brokers, and cdb > 0 is the data brokers’ merging cost in the upstream.
Let sk œ [0, 1] be k’s share of the joint profit given by an exogenously fixed sharing rule.
For our main analysis, we use a proportional sharing rule, to be specified in Section 3.2.1,
that reflects the data brokers’ respective bargaining power. However, other desirable
sharing rules, such as the Shapely value sharing rule can also be accommodated. We





0 if the downstream firm does not buy the merged data
sk · (P12 ≠ cdb) if the downstream firm buys the merged data
. (2)
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The data buyer. When data brokers do not share data, the buyer’s profits are as follows:




0 if the downstream firm does not buy data
fk ≠ pk if the downstream firm buys k’s data only
f12 ≠ pk ≠ p≠k ≠ cb if the downstream firm buys data from both
, (3)
where fi0 is the profit the buyer can make without data and cb is the buyer’s downstream
merging cost.
Alternatively, when data brokers share their data and sell the merged dataset, the buyer
obtains the following profit:




0 if the downstream firm does not buy the merged data
f12 ≠ P12 if the downstream firm buys the merged data
. (4)
Timing. The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, the two data brokers
simultaneously and independently decide whether or not to share their data. Data
sharing arises if, and only if, both data brokers choose to share data. In the second
stage, data brokers jointly or independently set the price(s) for the dataset(s). Then,
in the third stage, the buyer decides whether or not to buy the o ered dataset(s). The
equilibrium concept is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE).
3 Analysis
Before the analysis is presented, we first need to define the data structure taking into
account the merging cost, occurring either at the upstream (data brokers) or the down-
stream (the buyer) level. That is, our definition focuses on the net value of the final
dataset when two di erent data sources are combined.
Assume, without loss of generality, that f2 Ø f1. We categorize the data structure as
follows:
Definition 1. Under a given downstream merging cost cb facing the buyer, the data structure is
• downstream super-additive, if f12 ≠ cb Ø f1 + f2,
• downstream sub-additive, if f2 Æ f12 ≠ cb < f1 + f2, and finally
• downstream extreme sub-additive, if f12 ≠ cb < f2.
The corresponding upstream data structure can be analogously defined by replacing cb by cdb.
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We note that the net benefit entailed by the combination of two datasets does not neces-
sarily mirror the data structure in the absence of merging costs. For instance, a super-
additive data structure without a merging cost may result in an extreme sub-additive
data structure if the sharing activity takes place and its related cost is extremely high.
3.1 Independent data selling
We solve the game by backward induction. First, consider a second stage subgame where
at least one data broker has decided not to share data in the first stage and hence they
simultaneously and independently set a price for their own data.
After observing the prices (p1, p2), the downstream firm decides whether to buy, and
from whom, the dataset(s) so to maximize its profit (3). This gives rise to the demand
and revenue facing each data broker for any given strategy profile (p1, p2).
Proposition 1. (i) If the data structure is downstream super-additive, any pair of (pú1, pú2),
such that pú1 + pú2 = f12 ≠ cb and púk Ø fk, for k = 1, 2, constitutes a Nash equilibrium in
this subgame. The downstream firm buys both datasets and merges them.
(ii) If the data structure is downstream sub-additive, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in
this subgame in which púk = f12 ≠ cb ≠ f≠k, for k = 1, 2. The downstream firm buys both
datasets and merges them.
(iii) If the data structure is downstream extreme sub-additive, there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium in this subgame in which pú1 = 0 and pú2 = f2 ≠ f1. The downstream firm
does not merge the two datasets even when it buys both.
Proof: See Appendix.
The rationale of the above results is as follows. First, consider the data structure is
downstream super-additive. In this case, the two datasets are characterized by strong
synergies and complementarities persist even when considering merging costs cb. This
implies that rather than trying to price the rival out, each data broker prefers the rival to
sell its dataset too. This way, each data broker hopes to appropriate some of the (positive)
externalities the datasets produce downstream. As a result, in equilibrium the buyer
acquires data from both data brokers and merge them on its own.
We note that in this case of downstream super-additivity, there is a continuum of com-
petitive equilibria in which the data brokers always extract the entire surplus from the
buyer, i.e.,  úk +  ú≠k = f12 ≠ cb. This leaves the buyer 0 net benefit. Note also that
the merging cost that the downstream firm faces is passed upstream because, in any
equilibrium, the downstream firm will pay no more than f12 ≠ cb in total.
Consider now the case where merging two datasets leads to downstream sub-additivity.






f1 + f2 + cbf2 + cb
Figure 1: The data buyer’s surplus and the value of the merged dataset in the absence of
a merging cost, f12
than accepting its own marginal value to the rival’s dataset, an observation common
in Bertrand type price competition models. As a result, the unique equilibrium in (ii)
emerges. Note that even if the downstream merging cost was negligible, the prices set
by the data brokers are limited by the substitutability of the datasets when the structure
is sub-additive (e.g., overlapping information or high correlation between datasets).
In equilibrium, the buyer purchases from both data brokers and pays a composite price
of pú1 + pú2 = 2f12 ≠ f1 ≠ f2 ≠ 2cb, with a net benefit of f1 + f2 ≠ f12 + cb > 0. As a result,
the buyer is better o : in competition, data brokers have to discount the merging costs,
which are incurred by the buyer only once, and also the overlapping component.
Finally, merging costs can be large for the buyer such that the data structure gets extreme
sub-additive. This implies that combining di erent data sources becomes less appealing
and the buyer would only need the most valuable dataset. Under the assumption of
f2 Ø f1, only DB 2 sells its data in equilibrium for sure. Its equilibrium price in this case
equals the di erence in the datasets’ intrinsic values, whereas the rival is forced to set a
zero price, as a result of competition. The buyer obtains a net benefit of f1.
The following corollary summarizes the downstream firm’s surplus and, for comparison,
the industry profit of the data brokers.
Corollary 1. (i) If the data structure is downstream super-additive,  b = fi0 and  c1 + c2 =
f12 ≠ cb.
(ii) If the data structure is downstream sub-additive,  b = fi0 + f1 + f2 ≠ f12 + cb and
 c1 +  c2 = 2f12 ≠ f1 ≠ f2 ≠ 2cb.
(iii) If the data structure is downstream extreme sub-additive,  b = fi0 + f1 and  c1 +  c2 =
f2 ≠ f1,





Share  s1,  s2  c1,  c2
Compete  c1,  c2  c1,  c2
Figure 2: The normal form game at the first stage
Figure 1 illustrates the buyer’s surplus in relation to the gross value of themerged dataset,
f12. It is clear from the figure that the buyer is weakly worse o  as the value of the
merged dataset increases. It starts o  with a positive net benefit of f1 when the datasets
are downstream extreme sub-additive and ends up with zero net surplus in the case of
downstream super-additivity. The more synergy between the individual datasets, the
worse it is for the downstream firm.
3.2 Data sharing
Consider the subgame when both data brokers agreed to share their data. In this case,
they act as an exclusive supplier to the downstream firm for its specific project.7 As
they jointly make a take-it-or-leave-it o er to the buyer, if the data structure is upstream
super- or sub- additive, the total profit the data brokers can obtain is f12 ≠ cdb. If the data
structure is upstream extreme sub-additive, data brokers would not proceed to merging
the datasets and simply sell the most valuable one to the buyer, jointly obtaining f2. To
sum up, under a given sharing rule sk individual data broker’s profits are, for k = 1, 2,
 sk = sk · max{f12 ≠ cdb, f2}, (5)
where  sk denotes DB k’s profit under data sharing.
We now analyse data brokers’ decision on data sharing. Figure 2 presents the normal
form representation at the first stage of the game. To simplify the presentation, we assume
|cb ≠ cdb| Æ f1. That is, we exclude the less relevant cases where the cost di erence is
larger than the value of DB1’s dataset.8
For data sharing to occur as a SPNE, the joint profit of the data brokers when sharing
their data has to be no less than those under competition, i.e.,  s1 +  s2 Ø  c1 +  c2.
Otherwise, sharing cannot be a mutual best response at the first stage.
7Being an exclusive supplier of data for a specific project implies that the merged dataset cannot be sold
by any of the two parties independently. For instance, data can be protected by non-disclosure agreements,
binding contracts, or data brokers can share data through an encrypted cloud or a sandbox (OECD, 2019,
p.33).
8If |cb ≠ cdb| > f1, DB1 is very much disadvantaged and cooperation becomes a moot point.
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Proposition 2 (Joint Profits). (i) Suppose cb Ø cdb. The joint profits of the data brokers under
data sharing are no less than those under independent selling, irrespective of the nature of the
data structure.
(ii) Suppose instead cb < cdb. The joint profits of the data brokers under data sharing are no less





f1 + f2 + 2cb ≠ cdb if cdb ≠ f1/2 Æ cb < cdb
f1/2 + f2 + cb if cb < cdb ≠ f1/2
. (6)
Proof: See Appendix.
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the findings presented in Proposition 2.
Figure 3a focuses on the more natural case in which the buyer is less e cient than the
data brokers in merging the datasets, cb > cdb. One illustration could be an insurance
company that wants to access several potential clients’ characteristics for credit scoring
and profiling. For example, browsing history can be used to know an individual’s habits
and can be obtained through a data broker specialising in marketing. Di erently, data
related to income and wealth can be accessed through a financial data broker. These
data brokers routinely handle the latter data, whereas merging and cleaning separate
databases may be a considerably harder task for the insurance company. The solid
line (joint profits under sharing) is always above the dashed line (joint profits under
competition). As a result, data brokers are collectively better o  when sharing data as it
helps internalize downstream ine ciencies and avoid competition when their datasets
overlap.
Figures 3b and 3c consider the cases where the buyer is more e cient than the data
brokers, cb < cdb. For example, a dot com company, particularly e ective in handling data,
acquires new information from the data brokers. Sharing in such cases is only an option if
f12 < f̂12, that is, when the value of the merged datasets is su ciently small. Intuitively,
without the benefit of internalising downstream merging ine ciencies, sharing only
helps to increase joint profit when information overlapping is su ciently severe.9 The
graphs also illustrate how the cut-o  value f̂12 is derived in these two scenarios, i.e.,
when the downstream merging cost is relatively high or low compared to cdb ≠ f1/2.
9While in the current setting there is no incentive to share data when the data structure is super-additive
and the data brokers are ine cient, such an incentive to share may be restored if the demand for data
were downward sloping, for example as a result of buyer’s private information about willingness to pay.
In that case, individual sales of datasets would give rise to the well-known pricing externality (Cournot
complementarity externalities) forwhich prices are too high as data brokers do not internalize the externality
caused by the rival. Sharing data in such a case would remove such ine ciency. However, it is important to
note that this does not necessarily imply that data brokers would share data. The reason is that the benefits
from the internalisation of the Cournot e ect need to be weighed against the merging costs (which are







f1 + f2 + cdb
f1 + f2 + cb
f2 + cdb
f2 + cb






f1 + f2 + cb
f1 + f2 + cdb
f2 + cb
f2 + cdb f̂12






f1 + f2 + cb
f1 + f2 + cdb
f2 + cb
f2 + cdbf̂12
(c) The buyer is much more e cient (cb < cdb ≠ f1/2)
Figure 3: Data brokers’ joint profits from sharing (solid line) and from individual sales
(dashed line), and the joint value of the datasets
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3.2.1 Proportional sharing rule
Data sharing may not necessarily emerge even if joint profits are larger when sharing
than under competition. For sharing to be a mutual best response, individual sharing
profits must be no less than individual competition profits for both data brokers. To
compare these, we assume the following sharing rule that assigns a share of the joint
profits to a data broker that is proportional to the stand-alone value of its dataset. Namely,





On the other hand, when data are downstream super-additive, competition between
data brokers leads to a multiplicity of equilibria and, similarly, only joint profits are
identified. To enable the comparison, we introduce a parameter – œ [0, 1] to index the
Nash equilibria in the competitive subgamewhen data are downstream super-additive. –
captures the data brokers’ (common) belief about the share of the extra surplus assigned
to DB2. Formally, we select the equilibrium where
pú1 = –f1 + (1 ≠ –) (f12 ≠ cb ≠ f2) and pú2 = (1 ≠ –)f2 + – (f12 ≠ cb ≠ f1) .
In this way, we capture all possible equilibria, ranging from the one in which the extra-
surplus is allocated equally across data brokers (– = 0.5) to the ones characterized by a
very asymmetric surplus reallocation (– = 1 or – = 0).
We are now ready to present the main result of our analysis.
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium Sharing). (i) Suppose cb Ø cdb. Data sharing emerges in the
unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game, if and only if, f12 < f̃12 where





(1≠–)f2≠–f1 if – <
f2
f1+f2
Œ if – = f2f1+f2 and cb > cdb
0 if – = f2f1+f2 and cb = cdb
(cb≠cdb)f2




(ii) Suppose instead cb < cdb. Data sharing emerges in the unique Subgame Perfect Nash









f1+f2 if cdb ≠ cb <
f21
f1+f2





Consider the case where data brokers are more e cient than the buyer in handling data,
i.e., cb Ø cdb. Suppose first that the data structure features some complementarities. The
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previous proposition established that sharing could be industry-e cient, but this does
not necessarily arise. As under competition, data brokers may make very asymmetric
profits (given the multiplicity of equilibria), and sharing would make one of them better
o  but penalize the other. In other words, for either a large or a small –, one data broker
vetoes a sharing agreement provided that the joint profits are su ciently large. Only in
the special case where the expected competitive profit shares are exactly in line with the
sharing rule, do both brokers agree to share their data for any value of the joint dataset.
To obtain the uniqueness result, we di erentiate whether cb > cdb or cb = cdb as in the
latter case for any f12 Ø f1 + f2 + cb, competition can also be an equilibrium outcome.
The above discussion is reflected in the critical value of f̃12 and in the conclusion that
data sharing arises for f12 < f̃12 as defined by (7).
Turning to a sub-additive data structure, data sharing allows for a surplus extraction
that they would otherwise fail to implement fully with independent selling. Because
competition leads data brokers to provide a discount to the buyer (equal to downstream
merging cost and the overlapping component of the datasets), sharing data can restore
full surplus extraction. This way, data brokers can soften competition and internalize
downstream ine ciencies. A similar argument applies to an extreme sub-additive data
structure. In this case, data sharing is optimal for data brokers as it always allows them
to coordinate on ’throwing away’ DB1’s dataset and extract all surplus generated by the
most valuable dataset. Importantly, both data brokers are better o  with sharing under
the assumed sharing rule than under competition.
Suppose now that the buyer is more e cient than the data brokers. Note that in this
case, the benefit of internalising ine cient merging costs through sharing is absent and
hence, at least one data broker objects sharing when the data structure is super-additive.
When the data structure is sub-additive or extreme sub-additive, sharing can help data
brokers to appropriate some surplus otherwise left because of the overlapping compo-
nent between their datasets. However, this appealing strategy constitutes an equilibrium
only when the loss from the higher merging cost outweighs each data broker’s loss under
competition. When the value of the merged dataset is su ciently low, meaning substan-
tial overlapping information, then sharing would be optimal for both data brokers. As
a result, there exists a critical value such that only for lower values of the joint dataset
both data brokers agree to share and to take on the higher upstream merging cost. This
critical value is denoted by
¥
f12.
An interesting result emerges from the above discussion. At first, one may expect that an
incentive to share would emerge when complementarities between data are strong. For
instance, combining email addresses (or postal codes) with the browsing history would
provide the two data brokers with powerful information to be sold in the market for data.
Similarly, when data partially overlap or their joint use leads to quality deterioration,
the incentive to share would decrease as the incremental benefit of the rival’s database
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decreases too. On the other hand, joint selling may soften competition when data are
substitute, rendering sharing more appealing. Our model indicates that data sharing is
most likely to arise when datasets present forms of substitutability and data brokers are
more e cient than buyers in handling data. On the contrary, competition arises more
often when datasets are complements and there are upstream ine ciencies in merging
data.
As noted previously, the value of data is often contextual. The same datasets held by
the brokers can have di erent data structures, depending, e.g., on the data already
possessed by the downstream buyer. Suppose there are three units of data, A, B, and
C.10 Data broker DB1 has data A and B while DB2 has B and C. Suppose further that
the downstream buyer possesses A and C. With slight abuse of notation, it is easy to
verify that f1 = f2 = f12 = f(A, B, C) ≠ f(A, C). Consequently, the upstream data
structure is almost always sub-additive, and hence data brokers face fierce competition in
independent selling. As a result, in this example, data sharing between the data brokers
is very likely to emerge. Note also that the buyer’s data make those of the data brokers
completely overlapping with each other although, on their own, they are complements.
In this sense, the buyer’s data substantially enhance the data brokers’ incentive to share
data upstream.
Suppose the downstream buyer possesses data B instead. In this case, f1 = f(A, B) ≠
f(B), f2 = f(B, C)≠f(B) and f12 = f(A, B, C)≠f(B). In the absence of merging costs,
it is easy to check that the upstream data structure can be either super- or sub-additive
depending on the sign of f(A, B, C) 7 f(A, B) + f(B, C) ≠ f(B). Thus, the same data
held by the data brokers can have di erent data structures depending on the context.
Moreover, in this example, data B is available to all parties from the outset. By letting
f(A) = f(A, B) ≠ f(B), f(C) = f(B, C) ≠ f(B), and f(A, C) = f(A, B, C) ≠ f(B), our
baseline model can capture the same strategic situation without explicitly referring to
B. In this sense, the buyer’s data do not substantially alter the sharing incentives of the
data brokers.
Finally, consider the welfare implications of our analysis. Note that we abstract from
explicitly modelling consumers, and this greatly simplifies the analysis. In fact, as prices
are just transfers between data brokers and the buyer, if datasets are merged under both
regimes (competition and data sharing), welfare corresponds to the value of the data,
f12, net of the merging costs (cb and cdb, respectively). As a result, the welfare gain of
sharing vis-à-vis competition is simply the cost di erential,  W = W s ≠ W c = cb ≠ cdb.
For example, if cb Ø cdb then data sharing is welfare enhancing. Hence, according to
Proposition 3, part (i), for the values of f12 above the threshold f̃12 the equilibrium
featuring competition is ine cient.
Ine ciency in the opposite direction can take place when data brokers are less e cient
10We thank one anonymous referee for suggesting this insightful example.
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than the buyer (cb < cdb). In fact, competition is welfare enhancing when f12 Ø f2 + cb.11
However, the market outcome features socially ine cient sharing if f12 is between f2 +cb
and the threshold
¥
f12 of Proposition 3, part (ii). In case neither the buyer nor the data
brokers merge the two datasets, i.e., if f12 is very low, then only a reallocation of surplus
across parties occurs regardless of the scenario. In turn,  W = 0 and no choice is strictly
socially e cient. The previous discussion can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 4 (Welfare). (i) Suppose cb Ø cdb. In equilibrium, welfare decreasing compe-
tition takes place for f12 Ø f̃12. Otherwise, the equilibrium outcome is (weakly) socially
e cient.
(ii) Suppose instead cb < cdb. In equilibrium, welfare decreasing data sharing takes place for
values of f12 œ [f2 + cb,
¥




4.1 Alternative sharing rules
The sharing rule adopted in the previous section is just one among several possible
alternatives. For example, sk can follow the Shapley value implementation. Unlike the
proportional rule, the Shapley value captures the average marginal contribution of a
data broker to a given coalition, i.e., in our context, a data sharing proposition. Indeed,
the literature on the Nash implementation of the Shapley value demonstrates that it can
be the equilibrium outcome of a properly constructed non-cooperative bargaining game
(Gul, 1989).
The results obtained prove robust. Also in this context, data sharing arises for relatively
low values of the combined dataset, whereas competition prevails if combining datasets
generates high values. Moreover, sharing is more likely if data brokers are relatively
more e cient in handling the data and if the competitive equilibrium share of profits
is expected to be balanced, i.e., when – is close to the Shapley sharing rule. Overall,
compared to a proportional rule, a Shapley value sharing rule contributes to realigning
the choices of data brokers with industry e ciency.
Still, both the proportional and the Shapley sharing rules may lead to a loss of surplus
and ine ciency from the perspective of the data brokers. Indeed, if cb is larger than cdb,
11Note that the welfare gain of sharing vis-à-vis competition is simply the cost di erential,  W = cb ≠ cdb
for f12 Ø f2 + cdb, whereas if f12 œ [f2 + cb, f2 + cdb) the welfare gain of sharing is  W = f2 ≠ f12 + cb < 0,
as under data sharing data brokers do not merge datasets and jointly sell DB2’s units at a price equal to f2,
whereas under competition the buyer continues to buy from both and incurs merging costs cb.
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the joint profits always increase through sharing, but it is often the case that a proposed
agreement is vetoed by one of the parties. These sharing rules have been considered so
far as exogenously given. The sharing rule could be endogenized in several ways, and
a take-it-or-leave-it o er by one of the data brokers is a natural one. In such a setup, if
the industry surplus is higher under sharing than competition, the proposer will make
sure that the receiver will not veto industry e cient data sharing. Similarly, if the data
brokers engage in Nash bargaining with their profits in independent selling as their
respective outside option, the outcome will also be e cient for them.
There are reasons to believe that both types of sharing rules (exogenous or endogenous
as an outcome of a bargaining process) may characterize what happens in reality. In
fact, given data brokers’ repeated interactions over time, a fixed sharing rule may act as
a sort of (flexible) commitment, to be adjusted on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, whereas
an endogenous rule leads to industry e ciency, always negotiating an endogenous
agreement may be in itself overly costly for the involved parties.
4.2 Data can be partitioned
A key feature of data is its divisibility. That is, a dataset containing information regarding
N consumers and M attributes can be ’repackaged’ to contain information on alternative
sets N̂ of consumers and M̂ of attributes. One may wonder whether data brokers have
an incentive to operate strategically such partitions when competition occurs. A rationale
for partitioning might be that data brokers try to soften the very harsh competition that
occurs when data are sub-additive. In other words, if the original datasets feature some
overlaps or correlation, the data may be restructured prior to competition in a way that
eliminates or minimizes such issues.
We note, however, that this would not a ect the conclusions of our previous analysis
for two reasons. First, as part (ii) of Proposition 1 demonstrates, the data broker that
considered removing some overlapping information from its own dataset still obtains
a profit equal to its net marginal contribution, whereas the other data broker would
now obtain a higher profit. Second, selectively repackaging some information can be
particularly costly. For example, identifying specific variables and observations to remove
can be time-consuming for a data broker. This suggests that absent anti-competitive
side-transfers, a data broker may not have incentives to unilaterally reduce overlaps.
4.3 Sequential pricing
We also investigate whether data brokers’ incentive to share data changes when they
set their prices sequentially. The timing is changed as follows. DB k first sets pk and
then DB ≠k sets p≠k after observing pk. Given the resulting prices, the downstream
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firm decides whether to buy the dataset(s) and from which data broker. Regardless of
the order of moves, our main findings and intuitions remain qualitatively similar: data
sharing emerges as a tool to soften the competition between data brokers. However, as
compared to the case in which prices are set simultaneously, sharing arises less often.
The intuition is as follows. A first-mover advantage is identified with a downstream
super-additive data structure, which leads to the possibility of naturally selecting one
equilibrium from the multiplicity identified in the benchmark. Formally, this implies
selecting the equilibrium with – = {0, 1} from the benchmark model with cdb Æ cb,
and, hence, the most asymmetric surplus divisions. As a result, the first-mover has an
incentive to veto any sharing agreement, rendering competition the most likely scenario.
5 Conclusion and discussion
This article sheds light on the quite obscure and relatively underexplored market for
data. We present a model of data intermediaries and study their role as suppliers of
valuable information to downstreamfirms. A distinctive aspect of the sector, prominently
transpiring from the Federal Trade Commission’s (2014) report, is the exchange and
trade of data between brokers and how this relates to the particular properties of data, as
compared to other products (contextual value, merging costs, complementarities).
Our framework is compatible with a market for data in which data brokers repeatedly
interact to supply buyers in di erent sub-markets, and in which projects are buyer-
specific. We highlight how the incentives for data sharing are crucially related to the
nature of the data held by the brokers. Specifically, we find that data sharing can arise for
two reasons. First, data brokers can soften competition when data present some form of
substitutability. Second, it allows data brokers to internalize downstream ine ciencies,
as buyersmay be less e cient than data brokers inmergingmultiple datasets. In turn, we
identify a possible trade-o  between the positive e ects of cost internalisation, consistent
with the spirit of the EU Data Strategy (European Commission, 2020), and the negative
e ects of data sharing linked to reduced competition in this opaque market.
In particular, our analysis highlights the importance of the sub- or super-additive data
structures, the data merging costs, and the selection of the competitive equilibrium
for their decisions to cooperate on a shared project. These insights are also partly
consistent with the literature on co-opetition, which has long held that companies may
be collaborators with respect to value creation but become competitors when it comes to
value capture (e.g., Nalebu  and Brandenburger, 1997). In the context of our model,
collaboration may go beyond situations of value creation (e ciency savings) and can
soften competition between data brokers at the expense of their clients.
Our theoretical analysis rationalizes the large heterogeneity in the contractual arrange-
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ments and collaborations in this market, as also illustrated by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (2014). For a client, our results provide two rather counter-intuitive implications.
First, a firm may prefer to buy ’lower quality’ (e.g., sub-additive, with overlapping
information) data. This happens because competition between brokers intensifies and
the firm can retain some of the surplus produced through the data. Second, downstream
cost ine ciencies may prove to be an advantage as competition leads data brokers to
grant a discount to a downstream firm. This suggests that downstream firms may have
less incentive to develop their digital skills when there is a functioning data market.
The sector is not particularly transparent and reliable information to conduct a proper
empirical analysis of data brokers’ strategies is not easy to access. If data were available,
however, our model delivers testable predictions. For example, the probability that data
brokers may exchange a dataset required by a buyer should positively relate to their
relative e ciency in handling data compared to the buyers. The probability should also
increase in the data homogeneity, and decrease when composite information from a
variety of sources are usually in demand. At the same time, it might be inferred from
highly asymmetric revenues in competitive segments of the market that data sharing
has failed due to the profitable firm anticipating its dominant role.
Moreover, we shall note that the European Union and the United States have followed
di erent regulatory approaches on how data should be managed by intermediaries,
third-parties, and retailers. The European Union has tackled the issue of privacy more
strictly. More specifically, the EU GDPR has strengthened the conditions for consent by
consumers, who need to be explicitly informed about the final use of the data collected.
In other words, data sharing among di erent data brokers without prior authorisation
of consumers is deemed illegal, to the point that such regulation is often emphatically
evoked as the ’death of third-party data’.12 In the light of our analysis, the EU GDPRmay
have some unintended pro-competitive e ect in the upstream data market. Specifically,
the need of the explicit consent of the consumers to data sharing should reduce the
prevalence of this practice, with the further consequence of enabling downstream firms
to partially retain some of the data generated surplus.
Additionally, most of the attention of the policymakers has been devoted to the final use
of data and on how data sharing might create positive externalities and pro-competitive
e ects. Nevertheless, little attention has been given to data as an input, produced,
managed and traded by data brokers. Our analysis highlights that the co-opetitive
practices of data brokers might require additional scrutiny from a regulator.
Finally, we conclude with a few possible extensions for future work. First, it is important
to note that in our model we have assumed perfect information about buyer’s evaluation.
12See, e.g., Wired (2018), ’Forget Facebook, mysterious data brokers are facing GDPR trouble’, November
8, 2018.
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Related to the case of patent pools (e.g., Lerner and Tirole, 2004), incorporating uncer-
tainty about the buyer’s evaluation could create an additional incentive for data brokers
to share data in the presence of super-additive data structures. Second, for tractability, we
have also assumed that there are only two data brokers. We conjecture that our results in
the spirit of Proposition 3, i.e., data sharing emerges as the unique equilibrium outcome
when the merged value of individual datasets falls below a (possibly more demanding)
critical level, are likely to hold with more data brokers. However, data structures become
more involved in the presence of several individual datasets, as complementarity and
substitutability have to be specified among all possible merging decisions. This is akin
to the specification of a characteristic function in a cooperative game. We leave this
extension for future work where one can further explore the conditions under which
data sharing only takes place among a strict subset of the data brokers. Last but not
least, our model is also parsimonious in the downstream and does not directly model
consumers. A welfare analysis encompassing consumers would be of particular interest
in this context as, besides the e ect of data on product prices, data transfers and sharing
could a ect the risks of data leakages and, more generally, influence consumers’ privacy.
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appendix.
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